A Bioeconomic and Game Theoretic Analysis of the Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Dispute

This is an empirical analysis of the so-called Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Dispute between coastal nations such as the EU, Norway, the Faroe Islands and Iceland. In this thesis, firstly, we discuss the relevant biological and managerial aspects of Northeast Atlantic Mackerel. Then we begin to give a full factual depiction of the dispute. Based on the historical accounts of the dispute, we define the research problems of the issue. Further, we lay out the theoretical basis for solving such problems, i.e., fishery economics and game theory. By applying the theoretical framework and adopting the bioeconomic model, we solve the problems with extensive discussion and sensitivity analysis. The solution we find for the Mackerel Dispute is that all coastal nations should cooperate because such cooperation would lead to more NPV, recruitment and  escapement levels of the mackerel stock but less harvest collectively. However, only with a proper benefit sharing arrangement, such cooperation may be feasible, resulting in each individual player end up with more benefit than acting on its own.