Security of Supply in Competitive Electricity Markets: The Nordic Power Market

It is well known that in the absence of a complete set of markets or under conditions of monopoly and imperfect competition, optimal provision of quality can not be taken for granted. Market set in the restructured electricity markets is not complete, physical networks per definition are natural monopolies, market-power issues are yet to be resolved, not all the services supplied through the restructured frameworks are private goods and risk of government intervention is high during the times when market prices signal shortages. Sole reliance on the energy-only markets for optimal provision of security of supply under such conditions is mistaken. On the other hand, centralisation of decisions for provision of reserve capacity, such as the gas-reserve capacity proposal in the Norwegian system is not an efficient substitute for missing or imperfect markets. The solution lies in the design of permanent market-mechanisms that enhance the ability of energy-only markets to handle the medium and long-term security of supply. A carefully designed reserve energy certificates mechanism is a viable alternative in this context.