Attitude to regulations and motivation to comply: Empirical analysis of survey data from the coastal cod fishery

In this paper we analyse the fishermen’s attitude to regulations of the Norwegian coastal cod fisheries. Non-compliance is a severe problem for several reasons, most notably distortions of the economic efficiency of the fishery and disruption of information necessary for reliable resource management with possible over fishing as a result. The analysis documents that the motivation and degree of compliance increases if the structure of the fisheries contribute to positive profit; if the system is based on “fairness” for each sub-group of fishermen; by increased participation by the fishermen in the design of the control and regulation system, i.e. degree of compliance can increase with democratization; the more the fishermen understand the regulations, i.e. it is important to reduce the complexity of the system and find robust and simple rules; the less fellow fishermen cheat, the less will other fishermen follow this practise; the more flexible the system is with regard to the fishermen’s opportunity to fish alternative species as this will reduce the risk of decreasing income; and the more flexible the regulations are with regard to providing the coastal fishermen with the opportunity to catch more fish the more available the fish is close to the coast.